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Abstract. The right to ‘domestic remedies’, which ideally connects ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘em-
beddedness’ of the ECHR in the legal systems of member States, is deemed to play a crucial 
role for the Strasbourg machinery survival as well as for an effective protection of human 
rights, especially in the field of the ‘reasonable-time’ requirement. In this respect the Italian 
case seems an excellent test. Once a compensatory remedy was introduced in the Italian legal 
system by Law No. 89 of 2001 (the ‘Pinto Act’), it soon appeared that such a remedy could 
be considered ‘effective’ in so far as it was implemented in accordance with the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. Therefore a legal tool for the interaction between ECtHR and Italian courts 
had to be found. Nevertheless, the results of this interaction might suggest that the domestic 
remedy has neither increased the protection of the reasonable-time requirement in Italy nor 
is it the final solution to the ECtHR’s overload. 
Keywords: reasonable time, domestic remedies, principle of subsidiarity, interaction of 
jurisdictions, European Convention on Human Rights.
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 introduction
‘Subsidiarity’ and ‘embeddedness’, connected by the ‘right to domestic remedies’, 
are probably among the most appropriate key-words to summarize the recent debate 
about the present and the future of the european convention and court of Human rights 
(hereinafter, respectively: ‘the ecHr’ or ‘the convention’ and ‘the ectHr’ or ‘the 
court’). 
As concerns the first concept, even the inexperienced scholar will soon discover 
that the principle of subsidiarity is generally considered to be one of the core features 
of the international system for the protection of human rights set down by the conven-
tion.1
The principle of subsidiarity has deep roots in Western thought2 and has played a 
crucial role in the building of the european union.3 In the field of international human 
rights law it requires, on the one hand, ‘that local communities be left to protect and re-
spect the human dignity and freedom represented by the idea of human rights whenever 
they are able to achieve those ends on their own; in many cases, the aspect of subsidi-
arity will result in a degree of discretion over the interpretation and implementation of 
rights …’4. On the other hand, ‘to the extent that local bodies cannot accomplish the 
ends of human right without assistance, the larger communities of international societies 
have responsibility to intervene.’5 
Within the legal order of the convention ‘subsidiarity’ mainly assumes two as-
pects.
[a]s a procedural or functional concept it means that before appealing to the convention 
institutions, any applicant must have referred his or her complaints to all those domestic institu-
tions which can be considered to offer an effective and adequate remedy in the circumstances of 
the case; as a material or substantive concept it means that when applying the convention provi-
sions, the convention institutions have to make, wherever appropriate, due allowance for those 
legal and factual features which characterize the life of the society in the State concerned.6 
1 Limiting the references to the most widely known textbooks, see Harris, d.; O’Boyle, M.; Bates, e.; Buck-
ley, c. (eds.) Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. 2nd ed. 
Oxford university press, 2009, p. 13; Ovey, c.; White, r. Jacobs & White: The European Convention on 
Human Rights. 4th ed. Oxford university press, 2006, p. 18; Shelton, d. Remedies in International Human 
Rights Law. 2nd ed. Oxford university press, 2006, p. 124; Leach, p. Taking a Case to the European Court 
of Human Rights. 2nd ed. Oxford university press, 2005, p. 161; Sudre, F. Droit européen et international 
des droits de l’homme. 8th ed. paris: puF, 2006, p. 200; de Salvia, M. La Convenzione europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo. 3rd ed. Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2001, p. 73.
2 carozza, p. G. Subsidiarity as a Structural principle of International Human rights Law. American Journal 
Int’l Law. 2003, 97: 40−49.
3 Ibid., p. 49−53.
4 Ibid., p. 57−58.
5 Ibid., p. 58.
6 petzold, H. The convention and the principle of Subsidiarity. In Macdonald, r.; Matscher, F.; petzold, H. 
(eds.) The European System for the Protection of Human Rights. dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Ni-
jhoff publishers, 1993, p. 60.
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In the light of these explanations one can, for instance, understand why in the same 
judgment of the ectHr7 the principle of subsidiarity: a) is invoked both as a limit to the 
court review of the assessment made by the national competent authority8 and as the 
reason for the court supervision on such an assessment9; b) it is indicated as the ration-
ale of the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies10; c) it is considered as reflecting 
the need for an effective protection at national level of the human rights enshrined in the 
convention.11 
In this last meaning, the principle of subsidiarity is not far from the ‘embedded-
ness perspective’ (the second key-word mentioned above), which has been recently sug-
gested with regard to the relation between the convention and the legal systems of the 
member States. Indeed, this approach ‘seeks first and foremost to augment the mecha-
nisms available to remedy human rights violations in national law, obviating the need 
for individuals to seek relief at the regional level.’12 The more seriously convention 
standards are taken by national bodies, the more available are domestic procedures for 
challenging violations of fundamental rights, the lower is the rate of convention viola-
tions found by the ectHr.13 In case the national mechanisms are inadequate, the court 
‘should increase its supervision of domestic courts and political bodies and provide 
incentives for government actors faithfully to follow the court’s case law and to remedy 
convention violations at home.’14 
So a common core can be detected in such remarks, which, finally, constitutes a 
widely-held opinion among scholars15 and is strongly supported at the institutional lev-
el16: to ensure that each member State effectively secures convention rights in its own 
7 ectHr (Grand chamber), Mc Farlane v. Ireland, application No. 31333/06, judgment of 10 September 
2010.
8 Ibid., para 88–92.
9 Ibid., para 112–113.
10 Ibid., para 112; see also the joint dissenting opinion of judges Gyulumyan, Ziemele, Bianku and power, para 5.
11 Ibid., para 12; see also the dissenting opinion of judge Lòpez Guerra.
12 Helfer, L. r. redesigning the european court of Human rights: embeddedness as a deep Structural princi-
ple of the european Human rights regime. European Journal Int’l Law. 2008, 19(1): 139.
13 Greer, S. The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. cambridge 
university press, 2006, p. 132.
14 Helfer, L. r., supra note 12, p. 139.
15 See cartabia, M. La cedu e l’ordinamento italiano: rapporti tra fonti, rapporti tra giurisdizioni. In Bin, r.; 
Brunelli, G.; pugiotto a.; Veronesi, p. (eds.) All’incrocio tra Costituzione e CEDU. Il rango delle norme 
della Convenzione e l’efficacia delle sentenze di Strasburgo. Torino: Giappichelli, 2007, p. 20; Greer, S., 
supra note 13, p. 41 and authors therein quoted; cohen-jonathan, G. réponse aux propos introductifs. In 
cohen-jonathan, G.; Flauss, j.-F.; Lambert abdelgawad, e. (eds.) De l’effectivité des recours internes dans 
l’application de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Bruxelles: Nemesis – Bruylant, 2006, p. 
21−22; Gaja, G. art. 1. Obbligo di rispettare i diritti dell’uomo. In Bartole, S.; conforti, B.; raimondi, G. 
(eds.) Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamenta-
li. Padova: Cedam, 2001, p. 23−24; Wildhaber, L. a constitutional future for the european court of Human 
rights? Human Rights Law Journal. 2002, 23(5-7): 161−163; pisillo Mazzeschi, r. Esaurimento dei ricorsi 
interni e diritti umani. Torino: Giappichelli, 2004, p. 197−200; Loucaides, L. G. Il ruolo del giudice interno 
nel processo e l’applicazione della convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Rivista internazionale dei 
diritti dell’uomo. 1993, p. 599−607. 
16 See, for instance, the Interlaken declaration adopted on 19 February 2010 by the High Level conference 
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legal processes is one of the primary objectives for the convention system at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century. The right to an effective domestic remedy set forth by 
article 13 of the convention is, clearly, an unmovable pillar of this restored building.17
domestic remedies are deemed to offer an essential contribution in solving the 
overload crisis of the ectHr as well as to restore member States to their role of both 
decision makers and defenders of human rights.18 article 13 should be the tool to guar-
antee a stronger implementation of the convention, a higher level of protection for the 
human rights guaranteed therein.
In this respect, since the human rights enshrined in the convention mostly have to 
be protected at national level, there is a need to spread the knowledge of the ectHr’s 
case-law in the member States with special regard to the judgments of principle, that 
is to say those cases in which the Court specifies content and limits of the Convention 
rights, as well as to ensure an effective implementation of the judgments of the ectHr, 
namely when they underline a problem in the legal system of the concerned State rather 
than a contingent violation of the convention.19 Indeed, national remedies related to the 
rights set forth by the convention involve a domestic interpretation and implementation 
of the convention, whose provisions and ectHr’s jurisprudence cannot be easily sepa-
rated.20 Furthermore, when local remedies are applied in a manner which is consistent 
with the ectHr’s jurisprudence, they avoid or, at least, effectively redress the violations 
and, consequently, they stem the flow of applications directed to Strasbourg. In other 
words, ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘embeddedness,’ through the ‘domestic remedies,’ entail a 
closer interaction between national courts and the ectHr.21 
This article aims to investigate the practical functioning of the approach briefly 
described hitherto in the field of the protection of the reasonable-time requirement, en-
shrined in article 6, para 1, of the convention, with special regard to the Italian case. 
Several reasons can be suggested to justify this choice. 
on the Future of the european court of Human rights, at 2: the conference ‘[r]eiterates the obligation of 
the States parties to ensure that the rights and freedoms set forth in the convention are fully secured at the 
national level and calls for a strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity.’
17 See Interlaken declaration, at 3, Item B, para 4, c); committee of Ministers of council of europe, recom-
mendation rec(2004)6 to member states on the improvement of domestic remedies; Frowein, j. art. 13 as 
a growing pillar of convention law. In Mahoney, p.; Matscher, F.; petzold, H.; Wildhaber, L. (eds.) Protec-
tion des droits de l’homme: la perspective européenne/Protecting human rights: the European perspective: 
mélanges à la mémoire de/studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal. Köln: Heymanns, 2000, p. 545, 549; Helfer, 
L. r., supra note 12, p. 142.
18 In this respect it has been observed that ‘there are grounds for believing that judicial remedies which permit 
convention standards to be effectively litigated in national legal processes provide the best means by which 
such standards can be effectively integrated into national public decision-making’ (see Greer, S., supra note 
13, p. 87).
19 See the Interlaken declaration, at 3, Item B, para 4, a), b). c); committee of Ministers of council of europe, 
recommendation rec(2002)13 to member states on the publication and dissemination in the member states 
of the text of the european convention on Human rights and of the case-law of the european court of Hu-
man rights; recommendation rec(2004)6 to member states on the improvement of domestic remedies. 
20 This view is frankly promoted by the cOe institutions: see, for instance, parliamentary assembly of the 
council of europe, Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, resolution 1226 (2000) 
adopted on 28 September 2000, para 3.
21 Helfer, L. r., supra note 12, p. 134; carozza, p. G., supra note 2, p. 74.
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Firstly, excessive delays in dispute settlement can weaken the confidence in the 
justice system and, consequently undermine the rule of Law.22 For this reason the ac-
cumulation of breaches of the reasonable-time requirement ‘constitutes a practice that 
is incompatible with the convention.’23 Therefore, though occurring in otherwise sta-
ble and well-functioning democracies, such structural problems in the administration 
of justice are extremely serious, so moving the diligent scholar to canvass any possible 
remedy.
Secondly, it is generally recognized that delays in resolution of legal disputes ‘have 
been the single most litigated issue before the ectHr’24 and that complaints about the 
unreasonable length of domestic proceedings continue to represent a great burden for the 
Strasbourg machinery.25 The awareness of this situation was the cause of a spectacular 
overruling in Kudla v. Poland, where the Court held for the first time that the principle 
of subsidiarity (articulated in articles 1, 13 and 35, para 1, of the convention) requires 
the introduction of domestic remedies for the victims of violations of the reasonable-
time requirement.26 Well, Italy has significantly contributed both to the aforesaid Court’s 
docket crisis and reaction.27 
22 See ectHr, H. v. France, application No. 10073/82, judgment of 24 October 1989, para 58; committee 
of Ministers of council of europe, Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning the excessive length of judicial proceedings in Italy, Interim resolution cM/resdH. 2009, 42, 
adopted on 19 March 2009; parliamentary assembly of council of europe, Implementation of judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights, resolution (1516) 2006, adopted on 2 October 2006, 10; Tulkens, F. 
The right to a trial within a reasonable time: problems and solutions. In Venice commission, Can excessive 
length of proceedings be remedied? Strasbourg: council of europe publishing, 2007, p. 335, 342; Sudre, F., 
supra note 1, p. 391.
23 In these terms see the four judgments of the ectHr delivered by the Grand chamber on 28 july 1999 in the 
cases of Bottazzi v. Italy (application No. 34884/97), Ferrari c. Italia (application No. 33440/96), A.P. c. 
Italia (application No. No. 35265/97 and Di Mauro v. Italy (application No. 34256/96).
24 janis, M. W.; Kay, r.; Bradley, A. European Human Right Law. Text and Materials. 2nd ed. Oxford univer-
sity press, 2000, p. 454; in similar terms see jacot-Guillarmod, O. rights related to Good administration 
of justice (article 6). In Macdonald, r.; Matscher, F.; petzold, H. (eds.), supra note 6, p. 381, 394−395; 
Greer, S., supra note 13, p. 39, 76.
25 See, also for other references, Mowbray, a. Beyond protocol 14. Human Rights Law Review. 2006, 6(3): 
582; Greer, S., supra note 13, p. 39−40, 282.
26 ectHr (Grand chamber), Kudla v. Poland, application No. 30210/96, judgment of 26 October 2000, para-
graphs 146-156. In quite open words, the Court affirm that ‘[i]f Article 13 is … to be interpreted as having 
no application to the right to a hearing within a reasonable time as safeguarded by article 6 paragraph 1, 
individuals will systematically be forced to refer to the court in Strasbourg complaints that would otherwise, 
and in the Court’s opinion more appropriately, have to be addressed in the first place within the national 
legal system. In the long term the effective functioning, on both the national and international level, of the 
scheme of human rights protection set up by the convention is liable to be weakened.’ On this point see also 
the partially dissenting opinion of judge casadevall: ‘To state, as the court does … that the time has now 
come, on account of the number of applications relating to length of proceedings, to examine the complaint 
under article 13 taken setely smacks, in my view, more of expediency than of law’. Furthermore, the practi-
cal reasons behind Kudla v. Poland are underlined by several scholars: see, for instance, Helfer, L. r. supra 
note 12, p. 146; Frumer, ph. Le recours effectif devant une instance nationale pour dépassement du délai 
raisonnable: un revirement dans la jurisprudence de la cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Journal des 
Tribunaux—Droit européen. 2001, 77: 53; Flauss, j.-F. Le droit à un recours effectif au secours de la règle 
du délai raisonnable: un revirement de jurisprudence historique. Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme. 
2002: 179, 183; Beernaert, M.-a. de l’épuisement des voies de recours internes en cas de dépassement du 
délai raisonnable. Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme. 2004: 905−906. 
27 Wolf, S. Trial within a reasonable time: the recent reforms of the Italian justice system in response to conflict 
with article 6(1) of the ecHr. European public law. 2003, 9: 194; Caflish, L. The reform of the Euro-
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Thirdly, but no less important, almost ten years ago Italy introduced by Law No. 89 
of 24 March 2001 (the so-called ‘pinto act’) a domestic compensatory remedy in order 
to redress the victims of unduly lengthy proceedings.28 The time has come to evaluate 
achievements and problems of this remedy. 
 With regard to the former, The pinto act has involved quite an unproven interac-
tion between the Italian Supreme court (hereinafter ‘Corte di Cassazione’) and the ec-
tHr, whence a relatively new debate about the effects of the ectHr’s jurisprudence in 
the Italian legal system. The main results are resumed in the second paragraph.
With regard to the latter, some cases are reported in the third and fourth paragraph 
in order to verify whether the pinto remedy practically ensures an effective protection to 
the reasonable-time requirement. 
Some final remarks are expressed in the fifth paragraph.
1. the role of the ectHr’s Jurisprudence in  
the implementation of the pinto Remedy and  
the ‘Visa’ to the italian legal System
The effects of the ectHr’s jurisprudence in the Italian legal system soon became 
a crucial issue in the implementation of the pinto remedy following the decision of the 
ectHr in Scordino v. Italy (No. 1).29 
a few months after its introduction, in Brusco v. Italy30, the court welcomed the 
pinto remedy as ‘available’ and ‘effective’, since the parties of proceedings falling with-
in the ambit of article 6, para 1, of the convention could lodge an application before 
the Court of appeal, as judge of first instance, with a view of obtaining a finding of an 
infringement of the reasonable-time requirement and, where appropriate, just satisfac-
tion for any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained. Thus the pinto remedy 
was supposed to fulfil the requirements of articles 13 and 35, para 1, of the Convention; 
in other words, it was deemed to offer an adequate relief to the victims and, therefore, 
to prevent them from lodging with the ectHr further complaints related to the unduly 
lengthy Italian proceedings. But less than two years later, this optimistic assessment was 
reviewed.
In Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) the court underlined several critical aspects in the Corte 
di Cassazione’s jurisprudence related to the pinto remedy. 
pean court of Human rights: protocol No. 14 and Beyond. Human Rights Law Review. 2006, 6(2): 405; 
Greer, S., supra note 13, p. 78, 80, 103.
28 For an overlook of the various remedies in the cOe’s member State see Study on the Effectiveness of Na-
tional Remedies in respect of Excessive Length of Proceedings, adopted by the Venice commission at its 
69th Plenary Session (Venice, 15-16 December 2006), p. 15−21; Flauss, J.-F. Les recours internes destinés à 
garantir le respect ou la sanction de la règle du délai raisonnable consacrée par l’article 6(1) de la convetion 
européenne des droits de l’homme. In cohen-jonathan, G.; Flauss, j.-F.; Lambert abdelgawad, e. (eds.), 
supra note 15, p. 94−104.
29 ectHr, Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), application No. 36813/97, decision of 27 March 2003.
30 ectHr, Brusco v. Italy, application No. 69789/01, decision of 6 September 2001.
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Firstly, the applicants were not automatically considered to have sustained damage 
where there had been a finding of a violation of the right to a trial within a reasonable 
time. Indeed, this was quite the contrary of the ectHr’s practice in length-of-proceed-
ings cases, where just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage is generally awarded once 
the violation of article 6, para 1, of the convention is found. 
Secondly, in the case at stake the amount awarded to the applicants for non-pecuni-
ary damage by the court of first instance at the issue of the Pinto proceedings was more 
than ten times lower than the amounts awarded by the ectHr in similar cases. although 
the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national courts in the assessment of just sat-
isfaction should be observed, said the ectHr, ‘those courts must also comply with 
the court’s case-law by awarding corresponding amounts’. Since the sum awarded to 
Scordinos was not regarded as adequate and hence capable of making good the alleged 
violation, the applicants could still claim to be victims within the meaning of article 34 
of the convention.31 
Thirdly, and directly connected to the issue considered in the present paragraph, in 
Scordino the ectHr noted that the Corte di Cassazione had never entertained a com-
plaint to the effect that the amount awarded by the court of first instance was insufficient 
in relation to the alleged damage or inadequate in the light of the ectHr’s case-law. 
Such complaints, stressed the ectHr, have always been dismissed by the Corte di Cas-
sazione, ‘being treated either as factual issues outside its jurisdiction or as issues arising 
on the basis of provisions that are not directly applicable’. 
Indeed, according to a settled case-law of the ectHr about the rule of the prior ex-
haustion of domestic remedies, the applicant must have used the remedies provided for 
up to the highest level, only if and insofar as the appeal to a higher tribunal can still sub-
stantially affect the decision on the merits.32 as regards the pinto remedy, even though the 
decision of first instance can be appealed before the Corte di Cassazione33, such an appeal 
would be inadmissible if it concerned the amount of just satisfaction for non-pecuniary 
damage. Indeed, by virtue of article 2, para 3, of the pinto act the assessment of the just 
satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage is done, by the judge of first instance, on equita-
ble basis. In the Italian legal system the assessment of damages ‘on equitable basis’ is 
related to the proof of the alleged damages and, consequently, is considered as a factual 
issue, while the Corte di Cassazione can only deal with appeal on point of law.34 
The only way to extend the supervision of the Corte di Cassazione on the amount 
awarded by the judge of first instance was to invoke the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, re-
31 For this aspect see the following paragraph.
32 Zwaak, L. The procedure before the european court of Human rights. In van dijk, p.; van Hoof, F.; 
rijn, a.; Zwaak, L. (eds.) Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights. 4th ed. ante-
werpen–Oxford: Intersentia, 2006, p. 138.
33 See article 3, para 6, of the pinto act: ‘The court shall deliver a decision within four months after the ap-
plication is lodged. an appeal shall lie to the court of cassation. The decision shall be enforceable immedi-
ately.’
34 as an example of the limits of the Italian Supreme court’s competence regarding the supervision of the 
assessment of damages done ‘on equitable basis’ see Corte di Cassazione, judgment No. 12318 of 19 May 
2010; judgment No. 1529 of 26 january 2010; judgment No. 10111 of 17 april 2008. 
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lated to the assessment of just satisfaction in length-of-proceedings cases, as being part 
of the ‘law’ that the judge of first instance had to observe in Pinto proceedings. But the 
Corte di Cassazione used to dismiss any complaint based on article 41 of the conven-
tion and the related ectHr’s case-law, to which neither direct nor binding effect was 
recognized.
Nevertheless, the aforesaid principles, namely the non-binding effect of the ec-
tHr’s jurisprudence in the implementation of the pinto remedy, would have defeated 
the aim pursued through the introduction of the domestic remedy and would have en-
tailed a violation of the principle of subsidiarity since, once having obtained an inad-
equate redress at national level, the parties would have continued to be ‘victims,’ within 
the meaning of article 34 of the convention, and so to complain for the violation of the 
reasonable-time requirement with the ectHr. Therefore, after the Scordino warning, 
the Corte di Cassazione, sitting as a full court (Sezioni Unite), departed from its previous 
jurisprudence in four judgements of january 2004.35
Namely, in its judgement No. 1339 (Lepore v. Ministero della Giustizia) the Corte 
di Cassazione held:
as stipulated in [article 2, para 1, of the pinto act], the legal fact which gives rise to the right 
to the just satisfaction that it provides for is constituted by the ‘violation of the [convention] for 
failure to comply with the reasonable time referred to in article 6, para 1 ….’ In other words, 
[the Pinto Act] identifies the fact constituting the right to compensation by reference to a specific 
provision of the european convention on Human rights. This convention instituted a court (the 
european court of Human rights …) to ensure compliance with the provisions contained therein 
(article 19). accordingly, the competence of the said court to determine, and therefore to inter-
pret, the significance of the said provisions must be recognised.
as the fact constituting the right conferred by [the pinto act] consists of a violation of the 
[ecHr], it is for the court of the [ecHr] to determine all the elements of such a legal fact, which 
thus ends by being ‘brought into conformity’ by the Strasbourg court, whose case-law is binding 
on the Italian courts in so far as the application of [the pinto act] is concerned.
Hence, in its judgment No. 1340 (Corbo v. Ministero della Giustizia) the Corte di 
Cassazione affirmed, with special regard to the assessment of the just satisfaction, the 
principle that ‘the court of appeal’s determination of non-pecuniary damage in accor-
dance with article 2 of [the pinto act], although inherently based on equitable princi-
ples, must be done in a legally defined framework since reference has to be made to 
the amounts awarded, in similar cases, by the Strasbourg court. Some divergence is 
permissible, within reason’.
Through the 2004 overruling the Corte di Cassazione tried to overcome a hard diffi-
culty:—to affirm, in a civil law system, that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has to be regar-
ded, at least to a certain extent, as a ‘law’ whose violation by the judge of first instance 
can be complained with the Corte di Cassazione. The legal tool to this achievement is 
35 Corte di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite), judgments No. 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341 of 26th january 2004, reported 
in Italian Yearbook Int’l Law. 2003, 13: 245.
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intended to be the reference made by article 2, para 1, of the pinto act, to article 6 of 
the convention.36 
Still, some doubts can be cast on this doctrine. On the one hand, article 6 of the con-
vention, which article 2, para 1, makes reference to, does not concern the assessment of 
just satisfaction but the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time. On the other hand, 
it is the article 2, para 3, of the pinto act which rules the assessment of the pecuniary 
redress and indicates the criteria the national judge shall use, without making any refe-
rence to the convention.37 Therefore one could still claim that the criteria followed by 
the ectHr in the assessment of just satisfaction are not binding for the national judge 
since they concern the interpretation of article 41 (just satisfaction) of the convention, 
which has no direct effect in the implementation of the pinto remedy.38 
 another ‘visa’ for the ectHr’s case-law, in the view of the implementation of the 
pinto remedy, may be found at a higher level of the Italian legal system. 
according to article 117, para 1, of the Italian constitution, as amended by consti-
tutional Law No. 3 of 2001, ‘[i]n performing their legislative powers, the State and the 
regions shall respect the constitution and the obligations arising both from european 
union law and international law.’ 
In two fundamental judgments of October 200739 the Italian constitutional court 
said that, by virtue of the above mentioned article 117, para 1, of the constitution, 
statute law enacted by parliament and other legislative bodies has to comply with the 
convention, so that the convention is a parameter through which the constitutionality 
of a statute law is reviewed. above all, the constitutional court held that, taking into 
account articles 19 and 32 of the convention, it is for the ectHr to interpret the provi-
sions of the convention; hence the provisions of the convention have to be considered 
by the Italian judge and also by the constitutional court itself as they are interpreted by 
the ectHr. 
In this regard, more recently the constitutional court added that it ‘cannot substi-
tute its interpretation of the convention with that given by the [ectHr], since it would 
interfere with the competence of the [ectHr] as recognized by Italy through the uncon-
ditioned ratification of the Convention.’40
36 article 2, para 1, of the pinto act: ‘anyone sustaining pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of 
a violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ratified by 
Law No. 848 of 4 august 1955, on account of a failure to comply with the “reasonable-time” requirement in 
article 6, 1, of the convention, shall be entitled to just satisfaction.’
37 article 2, para 3, of the pinto act: ‘The court shall assess the quantum of damage in accordance with article 
2056 of the civil code and shall apply the following rules: (a) only damage attributable to the period beyond 
the reasonable time referred to in subsection 1 may be taken into account; (b) in addition to the payment of a 
sum of money, retion for non-pecuniary damage shall be made by giving suitable publicity to the finding of 
a violation’.
38 a similar reasoning can be found in corte di cassazione, Zullo, judgment No.14 of 3 january 2008, reported 
in Italian Yearbook Int’l Law. 2007, 17: 284. 
39 constitutional court, judgments No. 348 and 349 of 24 October 2007. For an overlook of the various issues 
examined by these judgments see Mirate, S. a New Status for the ecHr in Italy: the Italian constitutional 
court and the New ‘conventional review’ on National Laws. European Public Law. 2009, 15(1): 89.
40 constitutional court, judgment No. 317 of 30 November 2009.
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It is true that the Constitutional Court qualified its new doctrine on the rank of the 
convention and the ectHr’s case-law, noting that it must always aim to establish a 
reasonable balance between the duties flowing from international law obligations and 
the protection of other constitutionally protected interests; in other words the ‘conven-
tional review,’ carried out in the light of the ectHr’s jurisprudence, might be ‘coun-
ter-limited’ by other provision of the Italian constitution. Moreover, it is understood 
by some scholars that the Constitutional Court did not affirm the binding character of 
the ectHr’s jurisprudence, but the duty, for the Italian judge, to take into account this 
jurisprudence in the interpretation of the convention.41 
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that in its recent case-law the Italian constitu-
tional court has recognized an obligation upon the Italian courts to interpret domestic 
rules in the light of the convention and that, in this task, the Italian courts have to give 
to the convention’s provision a meaning that is, somehow, consistent with the ectHr’s 
jurisprudence.42
coming to the conclusion, since the pinto act has introduced in Italy a domestic 
remedy in respect of excessive length of proceedings, following up Kudla v. Poland, the 
Italian courts have to interpret and apply the pinto act in the light of article 13 of the 
convention, as interpreted by the ectHr.43 
as outlined by a well settled case-law of the ectHr, an adequate relief is among 
the requirements for the effectiveness of the domestic remedy.44 This aspect leads to the 
second part of the analysis, which is carried out below. 
2. the interaction of eCthR and national Courts in the  
implementation of the pinto Remedy: threshold of  
compensation of non-Pecuniary damage 
In the view of verifying if, thanks to the interaction of ectHr and Italian courts, 
the pinto remedy ensure an effective compensatory protection to the reasonable-time 
requirement, some judgments of the Corte di Cassazione are reported in the present and 
in the following paragraph.
41 See, for instance, palombino, F. M. Gli effetti della sentenza internazionale nei giudizi interni. Napoli: 
Editoriale Scientifica, 2008, p. 138−140; Cannizzaro, E. Sentenze della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo 
e ordinamento italiano in due recenti decisioni della corte costituzionale. Rivista di diritto internazionale. 
2008, 91(1): 140−141. In this perspective it is thought that the Italian Constitutional Court has adopted a 
similar approach to the Section 2 of the uK Human rights act -1998 and to the German constitutional court 
in Gorgülü-Beschluβ, judgment No. 1481 of 14 October 2004. 
42 For a recent summary of the position of the Italian constitutional court on the subject see Lamarque, e. Gli 
effetti delle sentenze della corte di Strasburgo secondo la corte costituzionale italiana. Corriere giudico. 
2010, 7: 955.
43 For a wider reasoning to this conclusion see de Santis di Nicola, F. L’interazione tra “livelli” di tutela (ri-
paratoria) del diritto alla durata ragionevole del processo: fondamento e linee di tendenza. Studi in onore di 
Modestino Acone. Napoli: Jovene, 2010, 1: 630−646.
44 See, for instance, Scordino v. Italy (No.1) and Mc Farlane v. Ireland, both quoted above, as well as the Grand 
chamber judgments of 26 March 2006 reported in the following paragraph. Furthermore apparently there is 
a general consensus among scholars on this point.
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Rossi and Others45, M.M.C.46 and Illiano47 concern the threshold of compensation 
for non-pecuniary damage as a condition for effective redress of violation of the reaso-
nable-time requirement. a short background must be offered for a better understanding 
of these cases. 
as said above, under pressure from the ectHr and in order to keep the pinto re-
medy ‘effective’ within the meaning of articles 13 and 35 of the convention, the Corte 
di Cassazione (Corbo) held that non-pecuniary damage had to be determined by natio-
nal judges within a legally defined framework, since reference had to be made to the 
amounts awarded in similar cases by the ectHr.
Few months later, aiming to set guidelines for the implementation of the pinto re-
medy48, the ectHr indicated the criteria followed in the assessment of just satisfaction 
(article 41 of the convention) in length-of-proceedings cases.49 
as regards non-pecuniary damage the ectHr considered that:
a sum varying between eur 1,000 and 1,500 per year’s duration of the proceedings (and 
not per year’s delay) is a base figure for the relevant calculation …. The aggregate amount will 
be increased by eur 2,000 if the stakes involved in the dispute are considerable, such as in cases 
concerning labour law, civil status and capacity, pensions, or particularly serious proceedings 
relating to a person’s health or life.
The cases decided in November 2004 were then referred, with Scordino (No. 1) v. 
Italy50 to the Grand chamber, which ruled on them on 29 March 2006.51 
coming back to the cases here reported, in Rossi and Others the court of first in-
stance, ruling on the pinto application, held that the length of the considered proceed-
ings exceeded by three years the reasonable time enshrined in article 6 of the ecHr; 
consequently it awarded 2,500 euro to each of the applicants, that is to say 750 euro for 
each year beyond the reasonable time. 
45 Corte di Cassazione, Rossi and Others v. Ministero della Giustizia, judgment No. 10415 of 6 May 2009. 
46 Corte di Cassazione, M.M.C. v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, judgment No. 16086 of 8 july 2009. 
47 Corte di Cassazione, Illiano v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, judgment No. 21840 of 14 October 
2009. 
48 as concerns the assessment of non-pecuniary damages, it has been observed that ‘fundamental fairness 
requires that similarly situated parties be treated in a similar fashion’; therefore there is the risk that ‘[t]he 
inability to achieve consistency in awards … erode general confidence in justice and the integrity of the hu-
man rights system’ (see Shelton, supra note 1, at 353). Hence it should be welcome that, as regards the award 
of compensation for non-pecuniary damage in length-of-proceedings cases, the ectHr has followed some 
scales to bring about equivalent results in similar cases (see Tulkens, F., supra note 22, p. 342) and that, 
finally, it outlines these criteria to the national courts. 
49 ectHr, judgments of 10 Nov. 2004 in cases Riccardi Pizzati v. Italy (application No. 62361/00), Musci 
v. Italy (application No. 64699/01), Giuseppe Mostacciuolo v. Italy (no 1) (application No. 64705/01), 
Cocchiarella v. Italy (application No. 64886/01), Apicella v. Italy (application No. 64890/01), Procaccini 
Giuseppina e Orestina v. Italy (application No. 65075/01), Giuseppe Mostacciuolo v. Italy (no 2) (applica-
tion No. 65102/01), Ernestina Zullo v. Italy (application No. 64897/01). 
50 In this case, after the decision on the admissibility delivered on 27 March 2003 and reported in the previous 
paragraph, the ectHr, sitting as a chamber, delivered a judgment on 29 july 2004.
51 See Granata, S. review of judgments and decisions delivered in 2005 and 2006 by the ecHr on Subjects 
relevant to International Law. Italian Yearbook Int’l Law. 2006, 16: 303−308.
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Rossi and Others appealed against this judgment to the Corte di Cassazione, claim-
ing that in the assessment of compensation, the judge of first instance had violated the 
parameters applied by the ectHr, which usually considers 1,000/1,500 euro as a base 
figure for the relevant calculation. 
Furthermore, the applicants questioned the compatibility of article 2, para 3(a), 
of the pinto act, which states that ‘only damage attributable to the period beyond the 
reasonable time … may be taken into account’, with article 117, para 1, of the Italian 
constitution, which, as said above, provides for compliance with international obliga-
tions. They invoked precisely articles 13 and 41 of the ecHr as the ‘intermediate law’ 
allegedly violated by article 2, para 3(a), of the pinto act in breach of article 117, para 1, 
of the constitution. So the Corte di Cassazione has been forced to assess if the conflict 
between national criteria and Strasbourg ones in the determination of just satisfaction, 
as regards the duration to be taken into account, undermined the effectiveness of the 
pinto remedy.52 
The Corte di Cassazione notes that, ruling on 29 March 2006 on the aforesaid 
Italian cases, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR did not confirm any general criteria, 
such as those outlined in November 2004, as binding on national judges in determining 
compensation for non-pecuniary damages. In evaluating the effectiveness of the pinto 
remedy within the meaning of articles 13 and 35 of the convention, the Corte di Cas-
sazione goes on to say, one should not merely consider whether, according to national 
legislation, the judge is to take into account either the entire duration of proceedings or 
only the period beyond the reasonable time. One should rather consider whether such a 
discrepancy affects the global attitude of the pinto act to ensure adequate redress for the 
violation of the right to reasonable length of proceedings.
In the Corte di Cassazione’s view, taking into account the Grand chamber judg-
ments of March 2006, the ectHr does not consider adequate only the sums which are 
manifestly unreasonable when compared with the minimum threshold of compensation 
which would result from the application of its criteria. More specifically ‘compensation 
which is not less than 45% of the amount usually awarded by the european court is 
considered to be adequate.’ 
accordingly, the Corte di Cassazione concludes that:
Since the criteria for calculation stated by the national law does not lead to the award of 
sums which are lower than 45% of the sums awarded in similar cases by the Strasbourg court, 
the aforesaid criteria does not violate the right to an effective remedy as interpreted by the court 
of Human Rights, on the condition that the EUR 1,000 base figure is respected.
52 also in Zullo (quoted above) the applicant alleged that according to the ectHr compensation should be 
determined taking into account the entire length of proceedings, not only the year of delay. But, unlike Rossi 
and Others, on this basis he claimed that the aforesaid article 2, 3(a), of the pinto act, did not comply with 
article 6 of the ecHr and, consequently, violated article 117, para 1, of the constitution. as recalled in 
the previous para (text and note 38), the Corte di Cassazione rejected this complaint, stressing that article 6 
(Right to a fair trial) does not concern the determination of adequate compensation for breaches of reason-
able-time requirement, while compensation matters are covered by articles 13 and 41 of the ecHr.
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The preliminary objection on the compatibility of article 2, para 3(a), of the pinto 
act with article 117, para 1, of the constitution is consequently rejected, as it already 
ruled in M.M.C. and Illiano, just to give two more examples among a well established 
case-law. 
 Nevertheless, in Rossi and Others the Corte di Cassazione quashes the appealed 
decision, since in determining compensation the judge of first instance awarded 750 
euro per year, so violating the parameter of 1,000-1,500 euro followed by the ectHr. 
Indeed, in the Corte di Cassazione’s view a certain discrepancy compared with the 
last Strasbourg parameter may be accepted, namely taking into account the stakes invol-
ved in the dispute, the number of courts dealing with the case throughout the duration of 
the proceedings and the conduct of the applicant. But consideration of these circumstan-
ces, says the Corte di Cassazione, must clearly appear in the reasoning of the decision, 
while it was totally lacking in the appealed one.
In the M.M.C case the Corte di Cassazione makes another step towards the re-
duction of compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Widely referring, as in Rossi and 
Others, to Grand chamber judgments of March 2006, the Corte di Cassazione notes that 
according to the ectHr: 
Where a State has made a significant move by introducing a compensatory remedy, the 
[Strasbourg] court must leave a wider margin of appreciation to the State to allow it to organise 
the remedy in a manner consistent with its own legal system and traditions and consonant with 
the standard of living in the country concerned. It will, in particular, be easier for the domestic 
courts to refer to the amounts awarded at domestic level for other types of damage—personal 
injury, damage relating to a relative’s death or damage in defamation cases for example—and 
rely on their innermost conviction, even if that results in awards of amounts that are lower than 
those fixed by the [Strasbourg] Court in similar cases.
above all, even if in the judgments of March 2006 the compensation awarded by 
the Italian court as the result of the Pinto proceedings was considered insufficient, le-
ading the Strasbourg court to award supplementary sums as just satisfaction, in the 
end total compensation was about 45% of what the ectHr would have awarded in the 
absence of a local remedy. 
On this basis the Corte di Cassazione holds that
[a]ccording to the most recent case-law of the [ectHr], if in the case under consideration 
there are no concrete elements to appreciate the significant relevance of non-pecuniary damage 
(such as, among others, what is at stake, also taking into account the standard of living of the 
applicant, the period beyond the reasonable time and the legitimate expectation that the judge 
will rule in favour of the applicant), … the Italian judge shall not award less than 750 euro for 
each year’s delay.53
 This new threshold, concludes the Corte di Cassazione, aims to prevent just sa-
tisfaction for lengths of proceedings from being ‘unduly lucrative’ for pinto applicants 
and is consistent with the amounts awarded in Italy for other types of non-pecuniary da-
mage. Moreover, also considering the different criteria about the period to be taken into 
53 Italics added.
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account in the assessment of compensation, the 750 euro base figure is not too far from 
the ectHr standards and so maintains the effectiveness of the pinto remedy.
The M.M.C. case—which concerned the right of the applicant to a periodic incre-
ase of a specific allowance relating to his duties as a registry staff member—has lasted 
eleven years for only one level of jurisdiction, i.e. eight years beyond the reasonable 
time. So the Corte di Cassazione awards the applicant 6,000 euro (750 euro per year’s 
delay), while it underlines that the violation of reasonable time in labour cases does not 
necessarily require higher compensation since the stakes involved in such cases are not 
considerable in themselves.
In the early autumn of 2009 the Corte di Cassazione ruled on the Illiano case, which 
arises from the proceeding concerning the acknowledgment of an attendance allowance 
sought by the applicant for assisting his invalid relative. This judgment both confirms 
and partially amends the principles stated in M.M.C.
as regards the former aspect, the Corte di Cassazione underlines that compen-
sation for non-pecuniary damage does not have to be increased by eur 2,000 in all 
cases concerning labour law, social allowances or the right to a pension. In the Corte di 
Cassazione’s opinion, the ectHr, although stating that higher sums must be awarded 
if the stakes involved in the dispute are considerable, has simply listed some examples, 
quoting cases concerning labour law, social allowances and the right to a pension. This 
means that:
stakes involved in these cases may be regarded54 as considerable; so the judge of first ins-
tance, ruling on the merit [of the pinto application], can award a higher sum if he is persuaded 
that the stake involved in the specific case is considerable for the applicant, but there is no duty 
either to indicate the reasons for the dismissal of the applicant’s plea for higher compensation or 
to rule on such a plea.
as regards the latter aspect, the Corte di Cassazione reiterates that compensation 
for non-pecuniary damage must not be lower than 750 euro per year’s delay. Neverthe-
less, this threshold, indicated in M.M.C., has to be confirmed ‘only for the first three 
years of delay, while for the following years the base figure for calculation is EUR 1,000 
for each year’s delay, as further delay clearly aggravates the damage sustained by the 
applicants.’ 
The parameter so indicated in Illiano was not implemented in that case, since the 
length of the proceedings at stake exceeded the reasonable time by only eight months. 
Thus one can easily conclude that the Corte di Cassazione has aimed to outline a new 
general guideline for the assessment of non-pecuniary damage, which the judges of first 
instance and the Corte di Cassazione itself will have to follow in order to award adequate 
compensation, bearing in mind ectHr’s practice. as a matter of fact at Strasbourg the 
assessment of just satisfaction per year’s duration does not follow a linear progression.
despite the Illiano adjustment, the Corte di Cassazione case law reported hereto is 
not entirely convincing. Nobody denies that, in the Grand chamber’s words, just satis-
faction at national level can be lower than that fixed by the ECtHR in similar cases, so 
54 Italics added.
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that a certain margin of appreciation is granted to the Italian judge in determination of 
non-pecuniary damage. 
But, since the domestic margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with the euro-
pean supervision, the Grand chamber pointed out some conditions which should be met 
at national level for a legitimate reduction of compensation.55 More specifically, in the 
ectHr’s view56:
The level of compensation depends on the characteristics and effectiveness of the domestic 
remedy. The court can … perfectly well accept that a State which has introduced a number of 
remedies, one of which is designed to expedite proceedings and one to afford compensation, will 
award amounts which—while being lower than those awarded by the court—are not unreasona-
ble, on condition that the relevant decisions, which must be consonant with the legal tradition57 
and the standard of living in the country concerned, are speedy, reasoned and executed very 
quickly.
In effect, none of these requirements is met by the pinto remedy. For instance, as 
for the possibility that the compensation for such non-pecuniary damage is lower if 
finally it is ‘consonant with the legal tradition’ of the concerned State, the Court has 
noted that ‘there is no disproportion in Italy between the amounts awarded to heirs for 
non-pecuniary damage in the event of a relative’s death or those awarded for physical 
injury or in defamation cases and those generally awarded by the court under article 
41 in length-of-proceedings cases. accordingly, the level of compensation generally 
awarded by the courts of appeal in Pinto applications cannot be justified by this type of 
consideration.’ 
above all, although the pinto decisions are immediately enforceable, the Italian 
State does not pay the sums awarded and consequently obliges the victims to bring 
enforcement proceedings.58 consequently the ectHr has recently held that the delay of 
the Italian State in paying the just satisfaction awarded at the issue of the pinto procee-
dings have to be considered a systemic problem.59 
 Nonetheless, one has to admit that the absence of the aforesaid requirements is 
not a grave omission, since the 45% threshold is considered by the ectHr as not affec-
55 Flauss, j.-F., supra note 28, p. 111−113; Bernaert, M.-A., supra note 26, p. 915; Venice commission, supra 
note 28, p. 22.
56 ectHr (Grand chamber), Cocchiarella v. Italy, application No. 64886/01, judgment of 29 March 2006, 
para 96−97. In the following analysis reference will be made to the text of this judgment, but the same prin-
ciples have been affirmed by the same wording in the other eight Grand Chamber judgments, also delivered 
on 29 March 2006 in the other cases quoted in note 49. 
57 See also Cocchiarella, para 80: ‘It will, in particular, be easier for the domestic courts to refer to the amounts 
awarded at domestic level for other types of damage—personal injury, damage relating to a relative’s death 
or damage in defamation cases for example—and rely on their innermost conviction, even if that results in 
awards of amounts that are lower than those fixed by the Court in similar cases.’
58 For the acknowledgment of this situation as a potential risk to the effectiveness of the pinto remedy see Coc-
chiarella, at para 127; add also Simaldone v. Italy, application No. 22644/03, judgment of 31 March 2009, 
para 78−85.
59 See Gaglione and others, application No. 45867/07 and others, judgment of 21 december 2010, para 
51−60.
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ting the effectiveness of the pinto remedy.60 The rationale of such a conclusion, which 
objectively offers some basis to the Corte di Cassazione ruling in the cases reported 
above, is understood to be the acknowledgment of the effort made by the contracting 
State introducing the domestic remedy61 as well as the assumption that such remedy ‘is 
closer and more accessible than an application to the court, is faster and is processed 
in the applicant’s own language; it thus offers advantages that need to be taken into 
consideration.’62 
 Nevertheless, one may observe that the court has found the pinto remedy to be 
affected by serious problems (for instance the aforesaid State delay in paying the sums 
awarded). In addition to this, even after the 2004 overruling of the Corte di Cassazione, 
the ectHr has found several violations in Italian length-of-proceedings cases, brought 
after the applicants have sought for non-pecuniary damages through the pinto procee-
dings and have obtained a sum which does not constitute an adequate redress.63 In light 
of these observations64, is it possible to claim that the Italian remedy is ‘faster’ and ‘more 
accessible’ than the application to the court, so that the compensation awarded can be 
45% of which the court would have awarded in the absence of a domestic remedy?65 On 
the contrary, ‘where the domestic remedy has not met all the foregoing requirements, it 
is possible that the threshold in respect of which the amount will still allow a litigant to 
claim to be a “victim” will be higher.’66 
Moreover, as indicated by the Corte di Cassazione in M.M.C., this new ‘45% stan-
dard’ has even been adopted by the ectHr itself in the March 2006 Grand chamber 
judgments and in its subsequent case law about Italian length-of-proceedings cases.67 
This result has been described as ‘disconcerting’ (‘déconcertante’) by a prominent ex-
pert on the subject68 since it seems to have a weak connection with the ‘guide’ for the 
assessment of non-pecuniary damages outlined by the court in the aforesaid judgments 
of principle. 
In sum, one might notice a certain inconsistency in the jurisprudence of the ectHr 
on the subject. But its practical result is clear: taking into account the new ‘45% stan-
dard’, the applicants have less chances to obtain by the ectHr a ruling on the merit and 
60 See, for example, ectHr, Cagnoni v. Italy, application No. 48156/99, decision of 11 december 2007; 
Garino c. Italy, applications No. 16605/03, 16644/03 and 16641/03, decision of 18 May 2006.
61 Cocchiarella, para 67.
62 Ibid., para 139.
63 See, among dozens of cases, Carbè and others v. Italy, application No. 13697/04, judgment of 23 june 
2009; Maria Vicari v. Italy, application No. 13606/04, judgment of 26 May 2009; Ambrosino v. Italy, ap-
plication No. 32745/02, judgment of 23 September 2008.
64 For other critical remarks on this issue see de Santis di Nicola, F., supra note 43, p. 656−660.
65 In this critical perspective see also andriantsimbazovina, j. délai raisonnable du procès, recours effectif ou 
déni de justice. Revue française de droit administratif. 2003, 1: 86, 94.
66 Cocchiarella, para 97.
67 In addition to Carbé and others, Maria Vicari and Ambrosino (quoted supra note 65), see Stornaiuolo c. 
Italia, application No. 52980/99, judgment of 8 august 2006, para 94; Delle Cave e Corrado c. Italia, ap-
plication No. 14626/03, judgment of 5 june 2007, para 50.
68 Flauss, j.-F., supra note 28, p. 122.
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a finding of violation of article 6, para 1, and 13 of the Convention.69 In other words, as 
in Kudla, one can better understand the ectHr’s position bearing in mind a practical 
reason. But what if the Italian courts take other steps in the opposite direction of Stras-
bourg jurisprudence? Guarino and Guarano offer an example of such a trend. 
3. the interaction of eCthR and national Courts in  
the implementation of the Pinto remedy: ‘ending Point’  
of Proceedings
Both Guarino and Guarano cases arise from first instance decisions which declared 
the pinto applications inadmissible as being time-barred on the basis of six-months rule 
enshrined in article 4 of the pinto act.70 In Guarino the application was lodged with the 
court of appeal some years after the enforceable decision was delivered, ascertaining 
the right to an increase of a social allowance, but only one month after the end of the 
enforcement proceeding which the applicant brought to obtain the sum already acknow-
ledged. In Guarano, the application was lodged during the enforcement proceeding 
(giudizio di ottemperanza) brought before the administrative court in order to obtain the 
payment of the sums already awarded some years before as the result of a declaratory 
proceeding. 
So in both cases the applicants underlined that their pinto application had been 
lodged within six months departing from the issue of the enforcement proceedings. In 
their view, since they had to bring the enforcement proceedings in order to enjoy their 
specific right, there was no ‘final decision,’ within the meaning of article 4 of the Pinto 
act, before the end of the enforcement proceedings. On this point, the applicants made 
reference to the relevant ectHr’s case law concerning article 6 (Right to a fair trial) 
and 35 (Admissibility criteria). 
The reported judgments71 uphold the appealed decisions by means of a common 
reasoning, which can be summarized as follows. 
First of all, according to the Sezioni Unite of the Corte di Cassazione, ectHr’s 
case-law does not confirm the applicant’s allegation that declaratory and enforcement 
proceedings must be considered as a whole.
Indeed, for the Corte di Cassazione, the ECtHR affirmed this principle ruling on the 
issue of the effectiveness of compensatory remedies related to the unreasonable length 
69 In this respect it seems interesting that in 2010 the ectHr has never ruled on the merit of Italian length-
of-proceedings cases brought after the applicants have obtained a compensation through pinto remedy: see 
Baccini and others v. Italy, application No. 26423/03, decision of 1 june 2010; Vallerotonda and others v. 
Italy, applications No. 52039/09 and 66483/09, decision of 18 May 2010; Vagnola S.p.A. and Madat S.r.l. 
v. Italy, application No. 7653/04, decision of 12 january 2010.
70 according to article 4 of the pinto act, any claim for just satisfaction may be lodged, at latest, ‘within six 
months from the date when the decision ending the proceedings becomes final.’
71 Corte di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite), Guarino v. Ministero della Giustizia, judgment No. 27348 of 24 de-
cember 2009; Corte di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite), Guarano v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, judg-
ment No. 27365 of 24 december 2009.
of proceedings. referring again to the Grand chamber cases of March 2006 as well as 
Simaldone v. Italia (all quoted above), the Corte di Cassazione consequently concludes 
that in those judgments execution is regarded as an integral part of the ‘trial,’ within the 
meaning of article 6 of the convention, with the sole purpose of indicating a condition 
which a compensatory remedy must meet to be effective. 
Insofar as, according to the Corte di Cassazione, the ectHr’s case-law does not 
outline any binding general principle on this subject, ‘it is for domestic jurisdictions to 
verify if the Convention lays down a specific notion of ‘trial’ which is binding also on 
the national legal systems and which obliges to take declaratory and enforcement pro-
ceedings as a whole.
The Corte di Cassazione offers, then, a broad overview of the Italian system of ju-
dicial protection of rights. as a result, the structural autonomy of enforcement proceed-
ings and declaratory ones is considered clear regarding the enforcement proceedings 
ruled by the code of civil procedure, under review in Guarino. 
This autonomy—admits the Corte di Cassazione—is more questionable regard-
ing the execution of judgments delivered by the administrative court, at least when it 
takes place in judicial proceedings also under the jurisdiction of the administrative court 
(giudizio di ottemperanza). In these cases, given that the effective protection of the ap-
plicant’s right acknowledged in the declaratory proceedings requires the conduct due 
from public powers to be specified, some previous judgments of the Corte di Cassazione 
have considered that such enforcement proceedings concur in the final determination of 
the applicant’s right, within the meaning of article 4 of the pinto act. But in Guarano 
the Corte di Cassazione rejects this reasoning and, in accordance with its prevailing 
case-law, reaffirms the autonomy of declaratory proceedings and the giudizio di ottem-
peranza. 
In fact, in the Corte di Cassazione view, declaratory and enforcement proceedings 
do not concern the same right: the former concern the substantial right asserted by the 
applicant, the latter concern the right to the execution.
as a consequence of the autonomy of declaratory and enforcement proceedings, 
their duration cannot be summed in order to obtain a whole, global duration. Further-
more, the time limit for the application, set by article 4 of the pinto act, has to be calcu-
lated departing from the final decisions respectively delivered in each kind of proceed-
ings. 
The Guarino and Guarano reasoning calls for critical remarks from the point of 
view of the national legal system. For instance, it is disputable that declaratory and en-
forcement proceedings do not concern the same right. In fact, even if these proceedings 
are surely autonomous from the structural point of view, their common purpose is to 
ensure that the applicant can effectively enjoy the right at stake. 
above all, one cannot conceal that the Corte di Cassazione has not made reference 
to the most pertinent precedents of the ectHr, while it has misunderstood those it has 
cited.
as regards the latter remark, nobody contests that the enforcement of the pinto 
decision was considered as a condition for the effectiveness of the domestic remedy in 
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Grand chamber cases of March 2006 and in Simaldone. Yet, in these cases the ectHr 
restates for the pinto proceedings in question a well-established principle under article 
6 of the convention which governs all sorts of proceedings concerning civil rights and 
obligations: 
[t]he court reiterates its case-law to the effect that the right of access to a tribunal guaran-
teed by article 6, para 1, of the convention would be illusory if a contracting State’s domestic 
legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one 
party. execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of 
the ‘trial’ for the purposes of article 6.72 
As for the former remark, it is sufficient to examine briefly one of the precedents 
invoked by the applicants in Guarino and Guarano, bearing in mind that also the ap-
plication to the ectHr has to be lodged within ‘six months from the date on which the 
final decision was taken.’73 
In Di Pede v. Italy the applicant complained about the length of declaratory pro-
ceedings which he had brought in order to force his neighbour to demolish a building, 
followed by enforcement proceedings which he had to lodge since his neighbour had not 
yet executed the due demolition.
The court considers that it does not have to express a view on the difference of opinion 
among legal writers as to whether under Italian law enforcement proceedings are autonomous; it 
is with reference to the convention and not on the basis of national law that the court must decide 
whether, and if so when, the right asserted by Mr di pede … actually became effective. It is that 
moment which constitutes determination of a civil right, and therefore a final decision within the 
meaning of article 26 [then article 35 of the convention]. 74
The ECtHR finally stated that the enforcement proceedings had to be regarded as 
the second stage of declaratory proceedings, so till the end of the enforcement procee-
dings no ‘final decision,’ within the purpose of the six-months rule, had been taken. The 
application concerning the length of the proceedings on the merits was consequently 
declared admissible and, in the assessment of the reasonable time, both declaratory and 
enforcement proceedings were considered as a whole75. 
The Corte di Cassazione has ignored this precedent, so it has not investigated whet-
her the ECtHR case-law offers another basis for its ruling. As a result of the affirmed 
principles, many pinto applications, lodged during enforcement proceedings but consi-
dering also the length of previous declaratory ones, can be declared inadmissible as time 
barred.
72 In these terms see, for example, Cocchiarella, para 87, quoting Hornsby v. Greece, Grand chamber, ap-
plication No. 18357/91, judgment of 1 april 1998, para 40.
73 article 35, once article 26, of the convention.
74 ectHr, Di Pede v. Italy, application No. 15797/89, judgment of 26 Sept. 1996, para 22.
75 These terms see, most recently, ectHr, Belperio et Ciarmoli v. Italy, application No. 7932/04, judgement 
of 21 dec. 2010, para 39, 45.
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Conclusions 
after an overall consideration of the judgments reported, it seems that a common 
policy inspires the case-law of the Corte di Cassazione relating to the pinto remedy, na-
mely that of discouraging applicants from seeking just satisfaction for excessive length 
of proceedings at domestic level. Sooner or later, this approach may involve a violation 
of article 13 and force the victims to proceed again before the ectHr. In other words, a 
sort of undesired boomerang would get back to the ectHr, which could either stop this 
trend, as it did with the Scordino decision in March 2003, or resign under the burden 
of its growing backlog. The practical reason, which has been indicated above as the 
possible explanation of a certain inconsistency in the ectHr’s jurisprudence about the 
amount of the just satisfaction, might steer towards the latter option.
On the one hand, ‘the workload of the court is directly dependant upon States’ 
commitments (financial as well as legal) to effectively implement Convention rights in 
their domestic legal systems.’76 On the other hand, the risk that The pinto act, instead 
of nationalising the litigation arising from the excessive length of proceedings, does 
not prevent victims of unduly lengthy proceedings from complaining with the court 
and even adds to the court’s workload a litigation arising from the inadequacy of the 
domestic remedy is utterly concrete.77 Thus, as the State is not completely playing its 
role of first line defender of the reasonable-time requirement, the ECtHR has to find a 
compromise between the coherence of its case-law and the practical limits arising from 
the scarce resources at the Strasbourg system’s disposal.
On the whole, according to a certain perspective, even an apparently endless series 
of Strasbourg court’s judgments concerning delays of judicial process in Italy is not an 
effective way of improving Convention compliance in this field.78 Finally, it relies on 
national political and legal forces to take notice of what the Strasbourg court says and 
finding the proper remedies.79 So the national level has to do more, but what? 
One could dispute that in the Italian case the introduction of a compensatory reme-
dy in respect of excessive length of proceedings, which proceeds from article 13 of the 
convention since Kudla overruling, has really increased the protection of the right to 
trial within reasonable time, entrusted in article 6, para 1, of the ecHr. as a matter of 
fact in 2009 the pinto act has been the third most disputed subject in the activity of the 
Corte di Cassazione; comparing to judicial year 2008, in 2009 30% more applications 
have been lodged to the courts of appeal; the State debt for payment of just satisfacti-
ons amount to eur 267 million.80 Therefore the compensatory protection of the reaso-
76 Mowbray, a., supra note 25, p. 584.
77 Such worries have been expressed by Flauss, j.-F., supra note 26, p. 185, 195; andriantzimbazovina, j., 
supra note 67, p. 95; Beernaert, M.-a., supra note 26, p. 914−916; Greer, S., supra note 13, p. 161. 
78 Greer, S., ibid., p. 174.
79 Ibid., p. 182.
80 For these data see the Report on the State of Justice in Judicial Year 2009, presented by the First president 
of the Corte di Cassazione on the occasion of the inauguration of judicial Year 2010 [interactive]. [accessed 
10-01-2011]. <http://www.cortedicassazione.it/documenti/relazione%20anno%20giudiziario%202009.
pdf>.
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nable-time requirement is weighing heavily on the Italian justice, that is to say on the 
very machinery which should guarantee a trial within a reasonable time. Quite on the 
contrary, as outlined in paragraph 1, one of the purposes of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘embed-
dedness’ should be that of improving the convention compliance. 
In this respect, an authoritative expert of the Italian civil justice has recently obser-
ved that, in a legal system affected by endemic problems with length of proceedings, 
all the efforts should be concentrated on planning and implementing serious reforms 
in order to ensure dispute settlement within a reasonable time, rather than to manage 
the litigation arising from unduly lengthy proceedings. a global reduction or even the 
temporary exclusion of the domestic compensation for victims of violations of the re-
asonable time requirement is, consequently, suggested as the way for a smooth reform 
of justice.81 
Nevertheless, some doubts can be cast on such a solution: to reduce or, thoroughly, 
to exclude the redress cannot be regarded as the necessary price for the reform of justice. 
In general terms, ‘rectification and compensation in the framework of basic rights serve 
to restore to individuals to the extent possible their capacity to achieve the ends that they 
personally value. as such, compensation may have an important rehabilitative effect, al-
leviate suffering and provide for material needs. a climate of impunity, in contrast, can 
leave serious negative consequences on individual survivors and ultimately on society 
as a whole.’82
Of course a pecuniary compensation does not constitute a genuine protection of 
the reasonable-time requirement guaranteed by article 6, para 1, of the convention. But 
denying even an adequate compensation for the violation of this fundamental right, at 
national or international level, resembles a summa iniuria. Without neglecting that, at 
least in general terms, compensation for human rights violations also constitutes a deter-
rence for the State, it is the importance of the right considered, strongly connected to the 
rule of Law, that calls for a double effort: to carry out reforms and, in the meantime, to 
afford an adequate pecuniary redress. 
Finally, in the light of the report and the related remark carried out in the present 
article, one may conclude that ‘subsidiarity’, ‘embeddedness’ and ‘domestic remedies’ 
are an interesting subject for research and legal reasoning. Yet, without adequate finan-
cial means both at national and international level, they might be regarded as the fig leaf 
of a weak protection of the right to a trial within a reasonable time.
81 consolo, c. La improcrastinabile radicale riforma della legge-pinto, la nuova mediazione ex d.lgs. 28 del 
2010 e l’esigenza del dialogo con il consiglio d’europa sul rapporto fra repubblica italiana e art. 6 cedu. 
Corriere giuridico. 2010, 4: 432−433.
82 Shelton, d., supra note 1, p. 11.
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eURopos ŽMogaUs teisiŲ KonvenCiJos sUbsidiaRUMo iR  
ĮsilieJiMo pRinCipai, sUsiJę sU pRotingo laiKo ReiKalaviMU: 
italiJos atveJis
Francesco de Santis di Nicola
Neapolio Federiko II universitetas, Italija
Santrauka. Manoma, kad teisė į „vidines priemones“, kurios jungia Europos Žmo-
gaus Teisių Konvencijos (EŽTK) subsidiarumo ir įsiliejimo (angl. – embeddedness) princi-
pus šalių narių teisinėse sistemose, turės esminę reikšmę Strasbūro mechanizmui išlikti bei 
efektyviai žmogaus teisių apsaugai. Kalbama apie priemones, susijusias su protingo laiko 
reikalavimu. Taigi Italijos atvejis gali būti puikus išbandymas.
Kai 2001 m. Įstatymu Nr. 80 (Pinto aktu) į Italijos teisinę sistemą buvo įvesta kom-
pensavimo priemonė, greitai tapo aišku, jog ji galėtų būti laikoma „efektyvia“ 13 ir 35 
EŽTK straipsnių prasme tiek, kiek ji būtų įgyvendinta, remiantis Europos Žmogaus Teisių 
Teismo (EŽTT) praktika. Dėl to reikėjo nustatyti teisinę EŽTT ir Italijos teismų bendravimo 
priemonę.
Šiuo atžvilgiu Italijos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Corte di Cassazione) šios valstybės ci-
vilinės teisės sistemoje bandė tvirtinti, kad EŽTT praktika turi būti laikoma, bent jau iki 
tam tikro lygio, įstatymu, įpareigojančiu nacionalinį teisėją. Teisine priemone šiam tikslui 
pasiekti turėtų tapti Pinto akto 2 straipsnio 1 dalyje esanti nuoroda į 6 EŽTK straipsnį ir 
pripažinimas EŽTT vaidmens, interpretuojant šią nuostatą .
Kadangi ši doktrina abejotina, įmanoma rasti kitą galimybę EŽTT praktikai įgyven-
dinti Pinto priemonę. Pirma, galima prisiminti, jog pagal dabartinę Italijos konstitucinio 
teismo praktiką, atsižvelgiant į 18 bei 32 EŽTK straipsnius, visas šios Konvencijos nuos-
tatas turėtų interpretuoti EŽTT, o Italijos teismai turėtų remtis šiomis interpretacijomis. 
Antra, svarbu pabrėžti, jog Pinto aktu, vykdant įsipareigojimą pagal 13 EŽTK straipsnį, 
Italijoje buvo įvesta vietinė priemonė. Taigi galima daryti išvadą, jog Italijos teismai turi 
interpretuoti bei taikyti Pinto aktą, atsižvelgdami į 13 EŽTK straipsnį, kaip interpretuoja 
EŽTT.
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Netgi sukūrus teisinę anksčiau minėtos jurisdikcijų sąveikos priemonę, tokios sąvei-
kos rezultatai rodo, jog vietinė priemonė nei pagerino protingo laiko reikalavimo Italijoje 
apsaugą, nei sumažino EŽTT darbo krūvį. Šį teiginį galima pagrįsti dviem pavyzdžiais: 
pirmasis susijęs su neturtinės žalos, atsiradusios dėl per ilgos proceso trukmės, kompensacijos 
pradžios tašku, o kitas – su proceso pabaigos nustatymu.
Kalbant apie pirmąjį, labiausiai susijusios teismų praktikos ataskaita rodo, jog 45 
proc. teisingos satisfakcijos, paskirtos EŽTT nesant vietinės priemonės, laikoma adekvačiu 
ir efektyviu kompensavimu. Vis dėlto nors ir pripažįstant, kad nacionaliniu lygiu teisinga 
satisfakcija gali būti mažesnė nei panašiais atvejais nustatyta EŽTT, negalima pamiršti, 
jog Didžioji kolegija nustatė keletą sąlygų, kurios nacionaliniu lygiu turi būti patenkintos, 
teisėtai sumažinus kompensaciją. Iš tiesų net EŽTT požiūriu Pinto priemonė neatitinka nė 
vieno iš šių reikalavimų.
Kalbant apie antrąjį pavyzdį, Corte di Cassazione nusprendė, jog aiškinamuoju ir vyk-
dymo procesu neturėtų būti siekiama Pinto pareiškimo, kuris turi būti paduotas per šešis 
mėnesius nuo to momento, kai proceso pabaigos sprendimas tampa galutinis, ar proceso 
trukmės vertinimo. Vis dėlto atsižvelgiant į EŽTT praktiką, ypač bylą Di Pede prieš Italiją, 
gali būti kitokia išvada.
Apibendrinant galima pasakyti, jog Italijos Aukščiausiasis Teismas trukdo pareiškė-
jams vietiniu lygiu siekti teisingos satisfakcijos už per ilgą proceso trukmę . Tačiau EŽTT 
turėtų atsargiai reaguoti į tokias nuostatas, kadangi nustačius, jog, įgyvendinant Pinto 
priemonę bus pažeistas 13 straipsnis, Strasbūrą gali užplūsti tūkstančiai Italijos bylų dėl 
proceso trukmės. Galiausiai galima daryti išvadą, jog tokia vietinė kompensacijos priemonė 
nėra pati geriausia išeitis sistemoje, kuriai būdingos proceso trukmės problemos. Arba galbūt 
pastangos reformuoti teisingumo sistemą turi būti padvigubintos, nesumažinant arba nepa-
naikinant adekvačios kompensacijos aukoms.
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jurisdikcijų sąveika, Europos Žmogaus Teisių Konvencija.
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